

Cryptography Engineering

- Lecture 12 (Jan 27, 2026)
- Today's notes:
 - Case study: Hash functions and Digital signature in Blockchain


Previous Topics

- Symmetric primitives: Hash functions, HKDF, HMAC, AEAD, ...
- Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DHKE), digital signature
- Certificate, TLS handshake
- Fujisaki-Okamoto Transform, CCA security
- Key encapsulation mechanism(KEM), post-quantum TLS (PQ-TLS), KEM-TLS
- Case study: X3DH + Double Ratchet => Secure messaging
- Password authentication, password storage (hashed + salted password)
- Password over TLS, SCRAM
- OPAQUE: Oblivious PRF + 3DH, against pre-computation attack


Today's Contents

- Hash & Signature in blockchains:
 - Brief background: public authenticated ledger and blockchain
 - Hash functions: Hash-linked blocks
 - Merkle tree: Commitment, inclusion proofs
 - ECDSA: Authorizing transaction


Trusted Ledger




“Bob pays 30€ to Alice”




Trusted Ledger




Trusted Ledger



Trusted Ledger



Some trusted bank



- Centralized trusted ledger
 - The ledger (e.g., history of transactions) is maintained by some authority
 - Centralized system

Trusted Ledger



Some trusted bank



- Centralized trusted ledger
 - The ledger (e.g., history of transactions) is maintained by some authority
 - Centralized system




- Efficient: Fast confirmation
- Simplicity and strong consistency
- Cost-effective in many settings

Trusted Ledger



Some trusted bank



- Centralized trusted ledger

- The ledger (e.g., history of transactions) is maintained by some authority
- Centralized system



- Efficient: Fast confirmation
- Simplicity and strong consistency
- Cost-effective in many settings



- Require trusted parties
- Single point of trust/failure
- Limited transparency / verifiability
- Potential censorship & Insider attacks

Decentralized public authenticated ledger

- Can we maintain a ledger **without trusting a single authority**, while still keeping it consistent and verifiable?
- Goal: Decentralized ledger that achieves
 - No single trusted maintainer
 - Public and transparent (e.g., anyone can verify)
 - Authenticated (e.g., transaction history is tamper-evident)

Decentralized public authenticated ledger

- Can we maintain a ledger **without trusting a single authority**, while still keeping it consistent and verifiable?

Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System

- Goal: Decentralized
 - No single authority
 - Public
 - Authenticated (e.g., transaction history is tamper-evident)


Satoshi Nakamoto
satoshin@gmx.com
www.bitcoin.org

Decentralized public authenticated ledger

- Use **blockchain** to build decentralized public authenticated ledger
- A blockchain system includes many components:
 - E.g., Consensus mechanisms, peer-to-peer networking, smart contracts...
- In this lecture, we focus on how to:
 - Use hash functions to build blocks and link them into a chain
 - Use Merkle trees to achieve tamper-evident commitment to transaction history
 - Use signatures to authorize transactions and prove ownership
 - Make them publicly verifiable


Hash Chain

- Let H be a hash function
- Motivated question: Suppose that we have many data blocks, how can we construct a **compact digest** to record their order?



Hash Chain


- Let H be a hash function
- Motivated question: Suppose that we have many data blocks, how can we construct a **compact digest** to record their order?



- ~~Trivial solution: Store all blocks and their order~~

Hash Chain

- Let H be a hash function
- Motivated question: Suppose that we have many data blocks, how can we construct a **compact digest** to record their order?




- ~~Trivial solution: Store all blocks and their order~~
- Use hash function:

$$\mathbf{Digest} = H(H(H(H(\text{prefix}, \text{Block 1}), \text{Block 2}), \text{Block 3}), \text{Block 4})$$

Hash Chain

- Let H be a hash function
- Motivated question: Suppose that we have many data blocks, how can we construct a **compact digest** to record their order?



- ~~Trivial solution: Store all blocks and their order~~
- Use hash function (**to hash the short headers**):

$$\text{Digest} = H(H(H(H(\text{prefix}, \text{Header 1}), \text{Header 2}), \text{Header 3}), \text{Header 4})$$

The Chain Structure in Bitcoin

Genesis block

- Anchor of the chain, no previous hashes
- Hardcoded into Bitcoin applications
- Publicly known

```
GetHash()      = 0x000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f
hashMerkleRoot = 0x4a5e1e4baab89f3a32518a88c31bc87f618f76673e2cc77ab2127b7afdeda33b
txNew.vin[0].scriptSig      = 486604799 4 0x736B6E616220726F662074756F6C69616220646E6F63657320666F206B6E697262206E6F20726F6C6C65636E61684320393030322F6E614A2F33302073656D695420656854
txNew.vout[0].nValue        = 5000000000
txNew.vout[0].scriptPubKey = 0x5F1DF16B2B704C8A578D0BBAF74D385CDE12C11EE50455F3C438EF4C3FBCF649B6DE611FEAE06279A60939E028A8D65C10B73071A6F16719274855FEB0FD8A6704 OP_CHECKSIG
block.nVersion = 1
block.nTime    = 1231006505
block.nBits    = 0x1d00ffff
block.nNonce   = 2083236893

CBlock(hash=000000000019d6, ver=1, hashPrevBlock=00000000000000, hashMerkleRoot=4a5e1e, nTime=1231006505, nBits=1d00ffff, nNonce=2083236893, vtx=1)
  CTransaction(hash=4a5e1e, ver=1, vin.size=1, vout.size=1, nLockTime=0)
    CTxIn(COutPoint(000000, -1), coinbase 04ffff001d0104455468652054696d65732030332f4a616e2f32303039204368616e63656c6c6f72206f6e206272696e6b206f66207365636f6e64206261696c6f757420666f722062616e6b73)
    CTxOut(nValue=50.00000000, scriptPubKey=0x5F1DF16B2B704C8A578D0B)
  vMerkleTree: 4a5e1e
```

(Image from Bitcoin Wiki)

The Chain Structure in Bitcoin

Block 0
(Genesis block)

Block 1:
Prev_hash = $H(\text{Block 0 Header})$
Merkle_root = ... (Explained later)
Other header fields...

Block body (Transactions)...

The header of a block includes:

- **Prev_hash and Merkle_root,**
- nVersion, nTime, nBits, and nNonce

The block body records the transactions included in the block (and related metadata).

The Chain Structure in Bitcoin

Block 0

Prev_hash
Other header fields
Block body

Block 1

Prev_hash
Other header fields
Block body


Block 2

Prev_hash
Other header fields
Block body

Block 3


Prev_hash
Other header fields
Block body

The Chain Structure in Bitcoin




- “Chain” all blocks in order using hash function / pointer, i.e., $\text{prev_hash} = H(\text{prev_header})$

The Chain Structure in Bitcoin




- “Chain” all blocks in order using hash function / pointer, i.e., $\text{prev_hash} = H(\text{prev_header})$
- **What if a block is tampered?**

The Chain Structure in Bitcoin




The Chain Structure in Bitcoin



- If the header of block 2 was modified, then we can easily detect it via Block 3's prev_hash.

The Chain Structure in Bitcoin



- If the header of block 2 was modified, then we can easily detect it via Block 3's prev_hash.
- **But what if only the block body of Block 2 was modified (e.g., inserting or changing transactions)?**

The Block Structure in Bitcoin

Conceptually, a Bitcoin block body is an ordered list of transactions:

$$\text{Block body} = (tx_1, tx_2, tx_3, \dots, tx_n)$$

Block i
Prev_hash
Other header fields
Block body

- Each transaction is a serialized objects (i.e., with specific data structure like (inputs, outputs, scripts)...)
- The **order matters**
- How can we detect if some transactions are not valid?

The Block Structure in Bitcoin

Conceptually, a Bitcoin block body is an ordered list of transactions:

$$\text{Block body} = (tx_1, tx_2, tx_3, \dots, tx_n)$$

Block i
Prev_hash
Other header fields
Block body

- Each transaction is a serialized objects (i.e., with specific data structure like (inputs, outputs, scripts)...)
- The order matters
- How can we detect if some transactions are not valid?

- A straight-forward solution: Compute

$$\text{tx_commitment} = H(tx_1, tx_2, \dots, tx_n)$$

and store the hash in the block header.

The Block Structure in Bitcoin

Block i
Prev_hash
Other header fields
Block body

- How can we detect if some transactions are not valid?

Block body = $(tx_1, tx_2, tx_3, \dots, tx_n)$

- A straight-forward solution: Compute

$tx_commitment = H(tx_1, tx_2, \dots, tx_n)$

and store the hash in the block header.

- **Drawbacks:** To verify, we must download the whole block to get all transactions
 - Not friendly to light clients
 - Not friendly to limited bandwidth or high latency network
 - No efficient way to prove inclusion of a single transaction

The Block Structure in Bitcoin

Block i
Prev_hash
Other header fields
Block body

- How can we detect if some transactions are not valid?

Block body = $(tx_1, tx_2, tx_3, \dots, tx_n)$

- A straight-forward solution: Compute

$tx_commitment = H(tx_1, tx_2, \dots, tx_n)$

and store the hash in the block header.

- Drawbacks: To verify, we must download the whole block to get all transactions
 - Not friendly to light clients
 - Not friendly to limited bandwidth or high latency network
 - No efficient way to prove inclusion of a single transaction
- In Bitcoin, we use **Merkle tree** to provide a compact and efficient commitment

Merkle Tree


- Example: Generate a commitment of 8 transactions A,B,C,D,E,F,G, and H.



Merkle Tree

- Example: Generate a commitment of 8 data blocks A,B,C,D,E,F,G, and H.


$$\text{Hash A} = H(\text{transactions A})$$



Merkle Tree

- Example: Generate a commitment of 8 data blocks A,B,C,D,E,F,G, and H.


$$\text{Hash AB} = H(\text{Hash A} \parallel \text{Hash B})$$



Merkle Tree

- Example: Generate a commitment of 8 data blocks A,B,C,D,E,F,G, and H.


$$\text{Hash ABCD} = H(\text{Hash AB} \parallel \text{Hash CD})$$



Merkle Tree


- Example: Generate a commitment of 8 data blocks A,B,C,D,E,F,G, and H.

$$\text{Merkle_root} = H(\text{Hash ABCD} \parallel \text{Hash EFGH})$$




Merkle Tree

- Merkle tree ensures that all leaf nodes (transactions) contribute to the root hash
 - One leaf node modified => Different root hash
- How do we handle odd numbers of nodes?
 - Duplicate the last leaf (which still preserves the property that every leaf influences the root hash)




Merkle Tree

- How can we verify a leaf is included in the committed set (i.e., included in the tree)?




Merkle Tree

- How can we verify a leaf is included in the committed set (i.e., included in the tree)?
- Trivial inefficient solution: Request all transactions and re-construct the tree
- Better solution: Merkle proof
- Example: Verify tx_A in Hash ABC




Merkle Tree

- Merkle proof: Leaf node + Merkle path \Rightarrow Recompute the root hash
- Example: Verify tx_A in Hash ABC
 - Leaf node: tx_A
 - Merkle path: Hash B, Hash CC




Merkle Tree

- Merkle proof: Leaf node + Merkle path \Rightarrow Recompute the root hash
- Example: Verify tx_A in Hash ABC
 - Leaf node: tx_A
 - Merkle path: Hash B (right), Hash CC (right)
- Example: Verify tx_B in Hash ABC
 - Leaf node: tx_B
 - Merkle path: Hash A (left), Hash CC (right)




Merkle Tree

- Merkle proof: Leaf node + Merkle path \Rightarrow Recompute the root hash
- Example: Verify tx_A in Hash ABC
 - Leaf node: tx_A
 - Merkle path: Hash B (right), Hash CC (right)
- Example: Verify tx_B in Hash ABC
 - Leaf node: tx_B
 - Merkle path: Hash A (left), Hash CC (right)
- Proof size: $\log(N)$ (the depth of the tree)




Merkle Tree

- Quick question: What is the Merkle path of tx_D



Transaction Inclusion Proof via Merkle Trees



Transaction Inclusion Proof via Merkle Trees



Light client
(only stores block headers)



Full node
(store all blocks)

The block's header already
included the **Merkle root hash**,
but no transactions

Transaction Inclusion Proof via Merkle Trees



Light client
(only stores block headers)

Merkle_root_hash
of block i




Full node
(store all blocks)

Transaction Inclusion Proof via Merkle Trees



Light client
(only stores block headers)

Merkle_root_hash
of block i




Full node
(store all blocks)


Request:
Prove that a transaction tx
is included in block i



Transaction Inclusion Proof via Merkle Trees



Transaction Inclusion Proof via Merkle Trees



Transaction Inclusion Proof via Merkle Trees




Light client
(only stores block headers)

Merkle_root_hash
of block i

Request:

Prove that a transaction tx
is included in block i



Full node
(store all blocks)

- (1) Find tx
- (2) Reconstruct the Merkle path of tx

tx , the Merkle path of tx



Recompute the root hash, and
compare with the Merkle_root_hash
stored in the local block header


Summary of Hash Functions in Blockchain

- Chain all blocks together via hash functions
 - prev_hash field in the block header
 - Preserve the order
 - Provide compact digests for each block
- Merkle tree:
 - Merkle_root field in the block header
 - Generate compact commitment of all transactions
 - Enable Merkle proofs for proving transaction inclusion (not full validity)
- Other parts involving hash functions but beyond today's scope:
 - Proof-of-Work mining: Mine a nonce such that $H(\text{block header}) < \text{Target} \rightarrow \text{broadcast} \rightarrow \text{others verify} \rightarrow \text{chain extends} \rightarrow \text{miner earns reward} \dots$
 - Identifiers, ...

Authorizing Transactions in Bitcoin

- In Bitcoin, users sign their transaction via **ECDSA**
- The balance of a user is maintained via the **UTXO** model
 - Roughly, coins are stored as **Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXOs)**
 - $\text{Balance}(\text{user}) = \text{sum of values of UTXOs that can be spent by their key(s)}$
- Conceptually, a Bitcoin transaction includes
 - Version
 - Inputs (includes unlocking data, e.g., the owner's signatures of all UTXOs with their previous lock_script)
 - Outputs (includes locking data, e.g., new lock_script and the new owner's address pk_hash)
 - Locktime
- To spend coins, a transaction
 - consumes some existing UTXOs as inputs (references to previous outputs)
 - creates new UTXOs as outputs (recipient + change)

Authorizing Transactions in Bitcoin



(pk, sk)

(1) Collect all UTXOs that he wants to spend

These UTXOs includes their references and previous lock_script (e.g., scriptPubKey)

(2) Sign transaction digest of each UTXO: $\sigma = \text{ECDSA. Sign}(sk, [\text{transaction digest}])$

(3) Include all σ in the new UTXO's input

(4) Create the output of the new UTXO: New lock_script (recipient, change, ...

(5) Broadcast transaction

Further Topics

- Transaction Malleability & SegWit
- Proof-of-Work & Difficulty Adjustment
- Consensus Mechanism
- Smart Contract